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INTRODUCTION
F ROM the very first deployments of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), motivated by military applications, security has been a major concern. Nowadays, WSNs are popular for IoT applications, such as smart cities, smart grids and healthcare [1] , [2] , [3] , but security threats could still pose costly and even life-threatening problems.
WSNs are by nature exposed to severe vulnerabilities, since they are often physically accessible, unattended, and continuously evolving because of sensors joining and leaving the network. Moreover, the use of security mechanisms such as complex cryptographic mechanisms is restricted because of computational constraints. Thus, the cost of exploiting such vulnerabilities is less a deterrent for malicious activities. In particular, the measurements' integrity may be impaired: we refer to this attack as malicious data injections.
Even when common security mechanisms are in place, they cannot prevent some of the attacks. In particular, an attacker can gain control over the WSN by physically tampering with sensor devices or manipulating the environment itself. In several scenarios, these cannot be prevented with proactive security mechanisms. For example, urban traffic sensors may be deliberately biased at the time they are implanted to silence alarms for road accidents. In such cases, the only mean to counteract malicious data injections is detection through analysis of the measurements themselves. This is possible because of inter-measurements correlation.
Correlations exist between measurements of different sensors across the WSN space, which we refer to as spatial correlation. Correlations also exist across the measurements of the same sensor in time, known as temporal correlations, and between multiple monitored phenomena, known as attribute correlations.
When spatial correlations are altered, they provide evidence of disagreements between sensors, which are likely to occur when genuine and malicious sensors coexist. Spatial correlation enables detection only if the measurements from a subset of sensors are substantially changed. This assumption is generally valid since the attacker's cost and risk for tampering with measurements of more sensors increases proportionally with their number.
On the contrary, temporal correlation fails to unveil malicious data if the attacker tampers with even a single sensor and applies a smooth transition between genuine and malicious data. The necessary assumption for the applicability of attribute correlation is that the sensor nodes monitor multiple phenomena, and one of them is not compromised. However, as multiple sensors are connected to the same sensor node, tampering with it enables the attacker to control all the monitored phenomena.
The chance of detecting malicious data injections depends on the ability to exploit correlation as well as on the attack's sophistication. We envisage that malicious measurements can be injected with any sophisticated strategy that maximises the damage to the WSN and minimises the risk of being detected. This is possible if compromised nodes collude, i.e., act in concert towards a common goal.
The problem becomes even more challenging when events occur in the monitored physical phenomenon. Wildfires are an example of event for temperature monitoring WSNs, while earthquakes are an example of event for seismic WSNs.
The effect of events is to transform the measurements correlations, especially when perceived only by a subset of sensors. This genuine change in correlation can be exploited by a sophisticated attacker to justify the correlation degradation brought in by malicious data.
We propose a method for detection of malicious data injections in the presence of sophisticated collusion strategies, based on a cross-scale analysis of the wavelet transform applied to the measurements in the spatial domain. Yet we highlight that detecting anomalies in the measurements is not sufficient to effectively counteract them. The alterations in the malicious measurements and the affected sensors need to be identified. We refer to this task as characterisation. Furthermore, we deal with the diagnosis of the identified anomalies. Indeed, genuine faults may also introduce anomalies, as the measurements from faulty sensors do not correlate with those of healthy ones. This may lead to the wrong conclusion that there was an attack, but by classifying the main characteristics of genuine faults we are able to infer when the anomaly is most likely malicious.
We present the problem of detecting, characterising and diagnosing malicious data injections in WSNs, propose a complete methodology to deal with each of these tasks and test its validity on two datasets: a synthetic set of temperature measurements in a wildfire monitoring WSN and a real dataset of seismic measurements in an earthquake monitoring WSN.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the related work. In Section 3 we detail the attacker model. In Section 4 we give an overview of our methodology. In Section 5 we describe the methods employed. Section 6 deals with the detection of anomalies. The effects of anomalies as well as the anomalous sensors are characterised with the procedure given in Section 7. The diagnosis process of the detected anomalies is performed with the steps shown in Section 8. Our experiments are described, along with the respective results, in Section 9. Finally, Section 10 summarises our conclusions and presents future work directions.
RELATED WORK
Although a considerable amount of literature deals with measurements integrity in WSNs, most work focuses on detection of anomalies at the network layer [4] , [5] , [6] . Such techniques are not applicable when the measurements are tampered with before reaching the network. For instance, a sensor node may be tampered with by exploiting physical accessibility or even before, when a new sensor node joins the network or replaces a faulty one. Also, the area around the sensor could be contaminated to produce false information (e.g., obscuring a light sensor).
A smaller, but still considerable amount of literature exploits measurements correlation to detect anomalies with two different techniques, which can be categorised into anomaly detection and trust management [7] .
Anomaly detection techniques focus on outlier detection: the expected measurements distribution is first characterised, e.g., through statistics [8] , clustering [9] , support vector machines [10] , etc., and then a measurement is considered anomalous if far from the expectation. The main idea of trust management techniques is to keep track of a sensor's cooperation in time, assigning it a trust value, which is constantly updated. This can be done by exploiting an expected measurements distribution [11] , or checking if a sensor correctly reports the presence of events of interest [12] . The information of sensors with a low trust value is considered less reliable, and so the impact of malicious data is reduced.
Most of these techniques have been proposed to detect generic anomalies rather than deliberate malicious injections, so they are not designed to cope with collusion, which drastically decreases the chances of detection. Moreover, the measurements distribution is assumed homogeneous [7] and this assumption does not hold especially when particular events of interest occur, such as wildfires, earthquakes, pathological conditions, etc.
In [13] , the measurements spatial patterns are learnt through linear regression to cope with non homogeneous measurements distributions across space that result from a single event source. This technique is designed to cope with collusion and thus is specific for malicious-related anomalies.
However, when multiple events with unpredictable locations occur, more sophisticated attacks are possible. For instance, a real event can be elicited to appear larger or masked to appear smaller, a spoofed event can be introduced close to a genuine event to gain credibility, a real event can be split into two or more events, etc. An example of a spoofed event next to a genuine event is shown in Fig. 1 . Distinguishing the two events is a complex task, so the spoofed event gains credibility.
Our novel approach uses a variation of Continuous Wavelet Transform (CWT) for non-evenly spaced samples to isolate the events' trends at specific locations and granularities, that are respectively referred to as translations and scales. The wavelet transform has been previously applied in its discrete form (discrete wavelet transform) for detecting faulty sensors during event detection [14] . Because of temporal correlation, the wavelet coefficients at the lowest scale fluctuate more in the presence of events. Attribute correlation, instead, makes the fluctuations observable in multiple attributes. Thus, faults are identified as fluctuations in time of the low scale coefficients that involve only a few attributes.
Nevertheless, this technique would not prevent an attacker to inject consistent measurements for multiple attributes whilst substantially changing them. Instead, we run the wavelet analysis in the spatial domain, that cannot be completely taken over with a limited amount of malicious sensors. This step, however, requires a method to characterise the normal low scale fluctuations. Our approach tackles this problem by learning the relationship between wavelet coefficients at different spatial scales.
Cross-scale correlation has been already exploited in the field of digital images steganalysis [15] , [16] . Because of significant differences between the two applications, there are several distinctions in the way we run detection, characterisation and diagnosis (the latter is not done in image steganalysis). For instance, the original image cannot be completely replaced by forged data, otherwise the ultimate purpose of image forgery disappears. On the contrary, the damage to a WSN is proportional to the number of measurements tampered with. Therefore, the area affected by malicious data injections could be difficult to identify and requires a deeper study during the characterisation phase.
ATTACKER MODEL
When detection of malicious data injections is carried out, the attacker must strike a trade off between the potential damage it can introduce and the risk of being detected: higher potential damage is more likely to cause evident disruptions in correlations and, in turn, trigger detection. Our attacker model considers malicious data that impair event detection and do not cause disruptions in correlation that are easy to identify. This is possible when considering attackers with large resources and conducting highly sophisticated attacks. In particular, we maximise the attack's sophistication to focus on the impact of the attacker's resources, above all the number of malicious sensors. Specifically, we assume attackers that: a) have full control of C sensors of their choice, b) have infinite time for the attack, and c) overhear the measurements of the other sensors.
We consider measurements injections that elicit or mask events, i.e., significantly increase or decrease measurements respectively, assuming events manifest as an increase in measurements within the event area. 1 Moreover, we consider scenarios that are naturally more complex to detect, such as spoofed events that can be introduced next to a genuine event, genuine events that can be masked partially to generate one or more smaller events, etc. The attack's sophistication is maximised by: a) calculating the subset of C sensors that minimise the risk of being detected when replacing their measurements with eliciting/ masking measurements, b) substituting the measurements of the C malicious sensors with colluding measurements that represent the same legitimate scenario observed in the past, c) smoothing the malicious measurements with the highest correlation with genuine measurements.
Note that distinguishing eliciting from masking attacks is generally a complex task, which may require more effort than detection. For example, in the scenario shown in Fig. 2 , two main behaviours can be identified: some sensors indicate the presence of an event (light blue/green), while some others do not perceive it (dark blue/violet). In particular, the event measurements are located in the center-left and the center-right. Assuming that malicious data injections have been detected, we may be in a masking scenario, where the two events have been masked (originally it may have been even one single event that has been split by the masking sensors); we may also be in an eliciting scenario where one, or even both events may have been spoofed. The problem becomes increasingly complex as the number of malicious sensors increases. When the attacker's capabilities are sufficiently high, the attacker may correctly reproduce genuine events without triggering detection or make malicious sensors be identified as genuine, and genuine sensors as malicious. In the next section we introduce our methodology designed to cope with such sophisticated malicious data injections.
METHODOLOGY
The full flow chart of our methodology is summarised in Fig. 3 and detailed in the following sections.
The first step is the detection of anomalies in the measurements. Except when boundaries imposed by physical constraints are not respected, the probability of observing a measurements set is rarely null. Therefore, any measurements set is assigned an anomaly score, i.e., an indicator for the probability that there are anomalies. This step is based on application of the wavelet transform (Section 5.1) and analysis of the relationship between the coefficients at different scales (Section 5.2).
Detecting an anomaly is generally not sufficient to identify the anomalous sensors. The second step, which we refer to as characterisation, identifies the anomalous sensors and determines if they have ELICITED or MASKED events. Identification of anomalous sensors is complex in the presence of collusion because malicious measurements can correlate well between themselves. Hence, we first identify groups of sensors with highly correlated measurements (Section 7.1). Then, measurement anomalies are translated into group anomaly scores, which are used to identify anomalous groups (Section 7.2). The general behaviour of the measurements in the anomalous group unveils if the anomalous measurements have elicited or masked events (Section 7.3). This, in turn, enables to link back the groupwise anomaly to the individual sensors (Section 7.4).
The presence of anomalies does not imply the presence of malicious data injections since anomalies may be caused by other phenomena, such as genuine faults. For this reason, we further evaluate the properties of the measurements to distinguish, among other, faulty and maliciously compromised sensors. We refer to the task of ascribing the detected anomaly to a particular category as diagnosis (Section 8).
METHODS
Our principle for detecting anomalous measurements is to contextualise the individual measurements of each sensor by relating it to broader behaviours. For instance, a steep change, if isolated is just a spike, while at the boundary of a wide transition is a change point.
The wavelet transform enables us to distinguish such scenarios thanks to a multi-scale analysis. While higher scales capture general trends, i.e., increases/decreases that are common to many points in space (for time series we would talk about the long-term trends), lower scales emphasise local variations.
Continuous Wavelet Transform
The wavelet transform provides analyses at multiple scales (which are linked to the signal's frequencies) and also at different translations, i.e., points in time/space (according to the domain of analysis). When applied to the measurements from a set of sensors with different locations, the scales represent the spatial granularity used to look at the measurements, while the translations represent different locations in the WSN deployment space.
We adopt the Continuous Wavelet Transform as opposed to the discrete wavelet transform, which is restricted to a fixed set of scales and translations. The CWT is instead continuous and can analyse a continuous range of scales and translations.
Specifically, we use the CWT proposed in [17] , as it adapts to non-evenly spaced samples. Indeed, sensor nodes are usually not evenly spaced, especially when they are mobile. The transform is defined by the equation below: 
In the equations above, we denoted scale and translation with s and t t respectively; v is the spatial location, while S is the sensed signal, which is known only at the sensors locations V. The principle behind the equations above is to isolate scale-specific trends of the measurements signal S through multiplication with the signal C s;t t , which acts like a filter, whose size depends on s. For each t t, the function works also as a spatial filter. Therefore, each wavelet coefficient ðT wav SÞðs; t tÞ is an indicator of the signal's spectral content for a fixed frequency and spatial range.
The way in which this is achieved depends on the actual function C. As in [17] , we adopt the second-generation variant of the "Difference-of-Gaussians" wavelet:
For b > 1, the second Gaussian is wider and more flat than the first, or in other words, the first emphasises more t t's neighbourhood. Their subtraction emphasises changes in the measurements that happen around t t and stabilise thereafter. Since a Gaussian transforms to a Gaussian with the Fourier transform, there is a similar effect also in frequency, i.e., C acts like a band-pass filter. The parameter b controls the wavelet's band-pass characteristics and is fixed to 1.87, i.e., the value that makes 1=s the dominant scale of analysis [17] .
The term h t t ðsÞ in (2) coincides with the standard deviation of the wavelet coefficient ðT wav SÞðs; t tÞ when S is a white Gaussian noise, hence we refer to this term as standardisation factor. For convenience, we also introduce the non-standardised version of the wavelet transform, i.e., This is to estimate a signal's energy at a certain scale. Indeed, division by the standardisation factor transforms a wavelet coefficient into a Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), which is scale and translation independent, but cannot be used for estimating the signal's energy. The relationship between the low scale coefficients and the energy of the higher scale coefficients of the measurements signal is the cross-scale relationship that enables detecting malicious data injections. Different signals, deployments and environments introduce different relationships, hence we learn this relationship with the method described in the next section. 
Learning The Events' Spatial Cross-Scale Relationships
The events' spatial propagation introduces changes in the measurements that are best observable at scale s e , the scale where ðT wav SÞðs; t e Þ is maximum, with t t e being the event's central location. The events' effect is also observable in transitions with small granularity, corresponding to a scale comparable to the average inter-sensor distance: s l . We observe that the relationship between coefficients at scales s e and s l is altered by malicious data injections, in consequence of the trade-off between two goals that a sophisticated attacker has: 1) noticeably change the measurements and 2) staying undetected.
If the attacker puts more effort into the first goal, the signal changes will be more abrupt and less supported by the malicious sensors' neighbours. The coefficients at low scale are thus large in module compared to higher scales. For example, the high scale coefficients of the spoofed event in Fig. 5 are comparable to those of the genuine event in Fig. 4 , but the coefficients at low scale are larger in the malicious scenario, because there is a gap between genuine rest measurements and false event measurements.
If the attacker puts more effort in the second goal, the gap between genuine and malicious measurements is reduced, and the low scale coefficients in turn. However, as shown in Fig. 6 , a spoofed event with low scale coefficients as small as the genuine event in Fig. 4 , also has smaller high scale coefficients than the same genuine event.
Ultimately, the chance of staying undetected needs to be traded with significant changes in the measurements if the cross-scale relationship is guaranteed. Such relationship is unknown and difficult to model because the effects of noise and environment are difficult to quantify. Moreover, the requirement of a model for each WSN application complicates the technique's deployment and introduces an additional point of failure: the accuracy of the model. For these reasons, we choose to learn the cross-scale coefficients relationship from historical data, which corresponds to learning the diffusion patterns of the underlying physical phenomenon.
Since such relationships arise from spatial correlation, the historical data should consist of snapshots in time of the measurements reported by each sensor. Such snapshots should arise from different event scenarios, hence we split the measurements time series into time windows where there are no events, one event, two events, etc. Afterwards, we take one representative time sample from that window, which is the sample where events are most remarked if any, or a random sample if there is no event. We refer to a specific time snapshot selected with this criterion as historical signal. Historical signals are transformed through the CWT and the relationship between low scale and high scale coefficients is learnt with Algorithm 1. Each historical signal is transformed with the CWT (line 4), and the contribution of higher scale coefficients is calculated by the quantity E t t x (line 6). We refer to such term as energy index, since it is related to the energy of the signal after isolating it in both space and frequency. Frequency isolation is achieved by summing only a set of higher scales hs. Space isolation is achieved by considering only a scaledependant neighbourhood, characterised by the Cone Of Influence (COI), which is defined as the area with a distance from t t less than the one where the boundary effects of the wavelet basis function start to be noticeable. For the wavelet transform that we used, the COI is centered in t t x and has a radius of approximately s spatial units [17] .
The cross-scale comparison requires defining a low scale s l , which is the average distance between a sensor and its closest neighbour, and of higher scales, which are selected to have little overlap with the low scale s l . Assuming that the overlap with the higher scales is l s l \hs , then an increase in the low scale coefficient by d causes an increase of the energy index by:
Note that the detection of malicious data lies in the fact that low scale coefficients can be altered with local measurements manipulations, while higher scale coefficients need several manipulations. Then, the following relationship should be ensured:
Where maxLsðEÞ is the maximum acceptable low scale coefficient for the energy index E, given by the learnt model. The meaning of (6) is that any increase of a low scale coefficient by d can only turn a normal cross-scale relationship into an anomalous one but not the other way around.
The function maxLs is learnt with a model fitting technique. This is done by dividing the energy indices into consecutive intervals and calculating the maximum low scale coefficient for each interval. The selection of the intervals is an optimisation problem: too many intervals lead to overfitting, while too few lead to underfitting. This is a well known model fitting problem, which we tackle with cross-validation [18] . Note that different models are learnt for positive and negative low scale coefficients, since they generally have different distributions, depending on the measurements function and on the wavelet basis function.
With the models available, the measurements can be tested for anomalies, as explained in the next section.
DETECTION
The models calculated with the steps described enable the comparison of low scale coefficients with high scale coefficients. We refer to the ratio between a low scale coefficient and its maximum acceptable value as anomaly score (A), calculated as:
wav SÞðs l ; t t x Þj=maxLsðEÞ:
Where t t x is the location of sensor x. Algorithm 7 shows that the model relating low scale and high scale coefficients needs to return the maximum acceptable low scale coefficient, given the input high scale coefficients' energy. The final step of detection consists in checking:
If this condition holds, anomalies are present. The threshold T d should be set according to the false positives acceptable. If the measurements used to learn the cross-scale relationship are a good representation of the whole measurements distribution, T d ¼ 1 ensures a false positive rate equal to zero (if outliers were filtered out during model fitting, it will be equal to the outlier rate). The real false positive rate may be higher if the dataset does not represent the data distribution well. In this case, a reliable false positive rate can be estimated empirically as shown in Section 9 to select the threshold that gives the most appropriate TPR/FPR combination. Such procedure may be repeated when new data, that does not comply with the current data distribution, is collected. At this point, the anomalous sensors need to be identified through the characterisation step shown in Section 7.
Computational Complexity
In WSNs, the computational complexity is important as the sensor nodes have often low computational capabilities and highly demanding calculations cause battery depletion.
Nevertheless, the algorithm that we introduced may be run from the system that analyses the measurements and takes appropriate reactions, e.g., at the base station or sink. Since this task can be complex because involves statistical analyses, decisions and transmission of control signals, the system in charge has generally less computational constraints.
Beyond the computational burden, reacting promptly to malicious data is also important. Note that the cost for detection is always met, while the characterisation and diagnosis comes into play only when detection triggers. Hence, we report below the analysis of the asymptotic computational complexity for the detection step:
Merging the measurements from N sensors in a time window with size W : OðWNÞ Calculating the wavelet coefficients at S scales: OðSN log ðNÞÞ (structuring it as a convolution). Estimating the energy of the high scale coefficients: OðSN log ðNÞÞ (structuring it as a convolution of the coefficients at a specific scale and the COI mask) Calculating the maximum admissible low scale coefficients: OðNÞ Testing the admissibility of each low scale coefficient: OðNÞ The total cost of detection is then OððW þ Slog ðNÞÞNÞ.
CHARACTERISATION
When detection triggers, we know that there are anomalies in the measurements but, at this stage, the responsible sensors are unknown. Without an accurate analysis, it is likely to confuse malicious sensors with genuine sensors and vice versa. For instance, if a set of malicious sensors collude and surround a genuine sensor, they can make it look responsible for the anomaly introduced.
Our approach to this problem is to make a group-wise analysis of conflicts between sensors, where sensors belong to the same group if their measurements are correlated. In this way, a genuine sensor is not judged individually and making it look responsible for the anomaly is harder for colluding sensors. The first requirement is thus to identify groups of sensors with correlated measurements, and then move from sensor-wise to group-wise anomaly analysis.
Sensor Grouping
When malicious measurements are correlated because of collusion, an anomaly may be evident only where malicious sensors are close to genuine ones. However, when a sensor's measurement disrupts correlations, the responsibility is shared among the sensors with the same behaviour, which is defined with respect to the events being sensed.
Events can be identified thanks to the wavelet coefficients: wherever there is an event, there is a peak in the wavelet coefficients at scale s e and translation t t x , which respectively characterise the spread of the event, and its centre (akin to the centre of mass, i.e., it is not necessarily a geometrical centre). Algorithm 2 identifies events peaks with a ridge lines-based peak detection algorithm (lines 1-3). It is a variant of the algorithm described in [19] , which in addition considers twodimensional spaces and extracts the peak scale, defined as the scale with the maximum coefficient in the ridge line. At such scale the main characteristics of the event can be captured, for instance if it has an increasing or decreasing trend. Ridge lines are sets of n-dimensional points that are local maxima with respect to at least one dimension. In [19] the dimensions considered are the wavelet scale and translation and ridge lines connect local maxima translations across consecutive scales. Local maxima are, by nature, not well defined since they depend on the degree of "locality". In our case, the smallest degree of locality is the distance between neighbouring sensors. To consider also higher degrees of locality, at line 7 we merge together two of such maxima that are within a certain distance (max d ) and instead assign the points to different ridge lines if such distance is overcome.
Algorithm 2. getEventsPeaks
If a point is associated with a long ridge line, i.e., it is a local maximum at many scales, it is more likely to be a true peak compared with a point within a short ridge line. Indeed, being a local maximum with respect to more scales indicates that the increase around that point is not transitory. For this reason, ridge lines shorter than min l are filtered out by the function filterRidgeLines at line 2.
The parameters max d and min l respectively represent the maximum distance between local maxima and the minimum length of ridge lines. There are well known heuristics for choosing such parameters [19] , which have proven to give satisfactory results in our experiments. After detecting peaks, each sensor is assigned to a group with Algorithm 3. For each identified peak, a sensor is assigned to the closest group where the sign of the coefficients at the peak and sensor's location coincide (line 8). Indeed, if the sign is discordant, the sensor's measurements do not follow the event trend. Finally, the groups are labelled (line 15): in this phase, contiguous sets of sensors belonging to the same group are given a common label. An example of the result of the grouping procedure is shown in Fig. 7 .
Identification of Conflicts between Groups
The locations where the anomaly score is high indicate the presence of a conflict between sensors in that area. A conflict arises when the measurements from different sensors originate from incompatible factors, for instance a real event and a spoofed event.
The remainder task for characterisation is to identify conflicting groups, and thereby the sensors that caused the conflicts. Since high anomaly scores indicate the presence of disruptions in correlation, a conflict is registered for the two areas that are the closest to each anomalous location. This step is summarised in lines 2-9 of Algorithm 4. 
Algorithm 4. findAnomalousGroups
Input: groups, AðxÞ; T c Output: Ag {Anomalous groups} 1: Conflicts(g1,g2) = 0 8 g1,g2 2 groups {Initialise group conflicts} 2: for all t t x : t t x 2 sensors do 3: if A(t t x ) > T c then 4: g1 = argmin g2groups ðdistðt t x ; gÞÞ 5: g2 = argmin g2groups;g6 ¼g1 ðdistðt t x ; gÞÞ 6: Conflicts(g1,g2) = Conflicts(g1,g2)+1 7:
Conflicts(g2,g1) = Conflicts(g2,g1)+1 8: end if 9: end for 10: Ag = {} 11: GA(g) = 0 8g 2 groups {Initialise group anomaly score} 12: while P g i 2groups P g j 2groups Conflictsðg i ; g j Þ > 0 do 13: for all g i 2 groups do 14:
GA(g i ) = P g j 2groups jg j jConflictsðg i ; g j Þ 15: end for 16: ag = g: GA(g) = MAX(GA) 17: Ag.append(ag) 18: Conflicts(ag,g) = Conflicts(g,ag) = 0 8g 2 groups 19: end while 20: return Ag During characterisation, the anomaly score is compared to the threshold T c , which differs from the detection threshold T d to find the trade off between the costs of acquiring malicious data and of losing genuine sensors. The value of T c should decrease with the former and increase with the latter and its choice, like for T d , can be done experimentally as shown in Section 9. In Fig. 7b , the locations where A (t t x ) > T c are marked with an "A". Since in both cases the closest groups are the green and the brown group, two conflicts are registered between these two groups.
The next step, corresponding to lines 13-15, makes a transition from location-wise to group-wise anomalies. Each group is assigned an anomaly score equal to the sum of conflicts multiplied by the size of the conflicting groups. The sum reflects the confidence increase in the incompatibility between the two groups when more conflicts are observed. Instead, the multiplication by the conflicting group size ensures the selection of the most likely scenario, under the assumption that the prior probability of having C anomalous sensors decreases as C increases. This is a consequence of the increase in attack's cost with the number of sensors to compromise. In the example of Fig. 7b , the brown group would correctly be blamed for the anomalies since it has fewer sensors than the green group with which is conflicting.
Finally, the group with the maximum anomaly score is added to the collection of anomalous groups and the procedure is reiterated until all conflicts disappear. Indeed, the malicious sensors may be divided into several groups, since they could act according to different behaviours.
Identification of the Effects of Anomalies
Having collected the anomalous groups, the first characterisation task can be completed, i.e., identification of the effects of anomalies. We characterise each anomalous group as an eliciting or a masking group if the measurements have been likely increased or decreased respectively. This information can again be extracted through the wavelet transform again. Indeed, the transformed coefficients are positive or negative in correspondence of increases and decreases respectively. Note that this information is scale-specific. So, for instance, transitory decreases within general increases produce negative coefficients at lower scales and positive coefficients at higher scales.
Since the sign of the local maximum associated with the group indicates the generic trend of the sensors within the group, the measurements were elicited or masked if the sign of the local maximum is positive or negative respectively.
Identification of Anomalous Sensors
The last step of characterisation is leading back from anomalous groups to anomalous sensors with the steps described in Algorithm 5. This consists of a filtering operation that keeps only the group locations where the low scale coefficients are positive/negative if the group was marked as ELICITED, or MASKED respectively.
Algorithm 5. characteriseAnomalousSensors
Input: Ag Output: As 1: As = {} 2: for all ag 2 Ag do 3: for all t t 2 ag do 4: if group.effect = ELICITED then 5:
As g ¼ ft t x : t t x 2 ag; ðT wav SÞðs l ; t t x Þ > 0g 6:
else {group.effect = MASKED} 7:
As g ¼ ft t x : t t x 2 ag; ðT wav SÞðs l ; t t x Þ < 0g 8: end if 9:
As ¼ As [ As g 10: end for 11: end for Indeed, given an anomalous group of sensors that is marked as ELICITED, the sensors that are most likely responsible for the anomaly are those whose measurements increase is more remarkable, i.e., those where the low scale coefficients are positive and high. Instead, the sensors where the low scale coefficients are negative and low may be genuine sensors that at higher scale appear as eliciting just because of the effect of their anomalous neighbours. A dual reasoning holds when a group is marked as MASKED.
DIAGNOSIS
After the characterisation step, each sensor is classified as anomalous or normal. However, anomalies could be explained by either: 1) Single-point failures 2) Common-mode failures 3) Malicious data injections.
Since the characteristics of malicious data injections are arbitrary and cannot be modelled, the means by which anomalies can be linked to malicious interference is by exclusion: the characteristics of both single-point failures and common-mode failures are modelled and inspected. If they match the data being analysed, then a diagnosis of single fault or group fault is inferred.
If both can be excluded, then we are most likely in the case of malicious interference. In the following, we describe the procedures to diagnose faulty behaviours.
Single Faults
By single faults, we mean the presence of genuine alterations in the measurements that trigger a single-point failure, i.e., impair the measurements of one particular sensor.
Single-point failures are characterised by large low-scale coefficients, since the measurements of a faulty sensor and its neighbours broadly differ. However, just like for malicious data, this is not matched by adequate high scale trends. Differently from colluding malicious measurements, 2 faulty measurements are independent from those of other sensors. For instance, in the presence of an event, the measurements of a faulty sensor may not be affected.
To detect measurements arising from a different distribution, we use the median absolute deviation (MAD) based outlier detection, which is known as an outlier-resistant outlier detection technique [20] , since the centre of the distribution is estimated with the median (which is not affected by extreme values) and the variation of the distribution is estimated with the median distance from the median (which is not affected by extreme variations). The single fault diagnosis procedure is summarised in Algorithm 6. The method is based on the modified z-score [21] : a robust variant of the z-score, which instead quantifies the distance from the mean, normalised by the standard deviation. Similarly, the modified z-score identifies as outliers the samples with a low probability of occurrence. The threshold T sf regulates the cutoff probability. In [21] , the suggested threshold is 3.5, but a higher value may be preferred to reduce the false positives further.
Single faults are identified when the threshold is crossed. Afterwards, the characterisation phase should be repeated to check the presence of also non-faulty anomalies and cope with the case where faulty sensors coexist with malicious sensors in the same group.
Group Faults
Group faults include alterations of the measurements that originate from non-malicious faults, involve more than one sensor, and introduce a common-mode failure, i.e., the fault's effect is similar among all the sensors. The key characteristic for diagnosing common mode failures relies just in this observation: the anomalous sensors produce similar measurements, without the typical gradual changes of real events, and of eliciting and masking attempts in turn.
Algorithm 7 summarises the diagnosis of group faults. The similarity of anomalous measurements is evaluated with a statistical operator, known as coefficient of variation (CV), which is defined as standard deviation divided by sample mean. The act of normalising by the mean enables to compute a relative variability, that is not affected by the samples magnitude.
Algorithm 7. diagnoseGroupFaults
Input: As g , Sðt t x Þt t x 2 As g , T gf Output: groupFaultDiagnosis 1:ĉ v = stdðSðt txÞt tx2AsgÞ meanðSðt txÞt tx2AsgÞ 2: return jĉ v j < T gf
The CV is compared to a threshold T gf which should be set according to the model of common mode failures. For instance, if the measurements of sensors subject to common mode failures are expected to differ only by noise, the threshold should be equal to the relative variation brought in by noise, i.e., the noise to signal ratio (inverse of SNR).
EXPERIMENTS
Testing the effectiveness of techniques against malicious data injections presents an innate problem: the absence of real malicious data. For this reason, we can only have recourse to simulation of malicious data injections, even though the simulated attacker's capabilities and strategy highly affect the estimated performance and need to be analysed carefully.
As pointed out in Section 3, we consider an attacker with full capabilities in sensors selection, attack time, and overhearing measurements. As a consequence, the parameter that mostly determines the attacker's capabilities in our model is the number of sensors injecting compromised measurements, denoted with C. We study the impact of such parameters by evaluating the results of our experiments with different values of C. Note that, on the other hand, detection is generally easier with a higher number of total sensors N. However, the detection performance depends also on the deployment and on the events' spatial propagation patterns: for instance if the attacker compromised all the sensors within the boundary of a generic event, such sensors are enough to mask the event without even being detected, regardless of N. For this reason, we fix the deployment distribution to a random uniform distribution of N sensors in a well-defined space and study the results with different values of C.
Another testing problem arises from events. As they are generally infrequent, measurements collected under the presence of one or especially multiple events are difficult to 2 . Note that non-colluding malicious data injections may show such characteristics. In this case, single faults require more specific analyses, such as fault statistics or fault characterisation (as described in Section 10).
retrieve. A possible solution is to simulate the measurements under event conditions when they are particularly rare. Despite that, one still wishes to have confidence that the technique is suitable for real measurements.
In addressing the problems described above, we tested our technique both on synthetic and real measurements. We prove the applicability of the technique on a few real sets of measurements, while we evaluate the detection, characterisation and diagnosis performance on several sets of synthetic measurements.
Simulation of Sophisticated Malicious Data Injections
To reduce the detectability of malicious data injections, the compromised data can be extracted from normal scenarios. Eliciting malicious data injections can then be simulated with genuine event measurements that an attacker may have observed in the past. For masking attacks, malicious measurements can be simulated with genuine measurements sensed in the absence of events.
To compare fairly the performance with different values of C, N genuine measurements are generated, and the attacker will select the best C out of N measurements, i.e., those that minimise the anomaly score when replaced by their malicious counterpart. Such measurements are obtained when all the malicious sensors should collude towards the same goal, i.e., spoofing or masking the same event (we analyse in the Supplement the performance when the colluding power is split to achieve multiple goals). Moreover, the best measurements minimise the maximum expected correlation between a genuine and a malicious sensor. Indeed, if a malicious measurement is expected to be highly correlated with a genuine measurement, significant changes in the former would introduce obvious anomalies.
Finally, we apply a smoothing operation at the areas of transition between genuine and malicious measurements. This operation is similar to the blurring trick used in image forgery when inserting an extraneous object inside an image [22] . The blurring is implemented by substituting the measurements of C b malicious sensors with the average of the n nearest neighbours. We refer to these sensors as blending in sensors and in our experiments they are set to 50 percent of C.
Synthetic Wildfire Temperatures Dataset
This synthetic dataset simulates temperature measurements, perceived in the presence of fires in an area of 100 Â 100 m 2 . The fires are modelled with one or more spherical black bodies with temperature T i (between 573.15 and 1473.15 Kelvin [23] , [24] ), with radius r i , centred in c i , and whose power is radiated to each location s at distance dðc i ; sÞ, producing the temperature:
Where N is additive zero-mean Gaussian noise with 30 K standard deviation, which simulates the interference arising from the sensing devices. T ðsÞ is sampled at 200 random locations to simulate the sensors' measurements.
Detection
We first evaluate the detection of malicious data injections with the receiver operating characteristic (ROC), which shows the relationship between true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR). To obtain the FPR, we simulated 50 sets of genuine measurements and gathered the frequency of positive detection. To obtain the TPR, we first simulated 50 sets of genuine measurements, then we simulated malicious data injections with the method described in Section 9.1, and finally collected the frequency of positive detection. Events are generated with random locations and peak temperatures (corresponding to parameters c i and T i in (9)) and with radius r i ¼ 22 metres both for elicited and masked events (the performance with r i ¼ 7 is analysed for comparison in the Supplement).
We made an analogous analysis for the algorithm described in [25] , which is an Iterative filtering-based algorithm for detecting malicious colluding sensor nodes. The steps of the algorithm are: 1) For each time instant, the measurements of all sensors are aggregated with iterative filtering.
2) The error time series of each sensor is calculated, i.e., the difference between a sensor's measurements time series and the aggregates time series. 3) Errors are collected in batches, normalised with subtraction of mean and division by standard deviation, and tested for normality. In the last step the sensor is classified as malicious if its measurements are not normally distributed. The normality test is run with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which quantifies the distance between the errors distribution and the normal distribution. In particular errors are not normally distributed if such distance is bigger than a threshold T IF . Since this algorithm performs detection with the granularity of sensors, we assume that the detection of malicious data injections is positive if at least one sensor fails the test.
We split the analysis into eliciting and masking scenarios, shown respectively in Figs. 8 and 9. For both we present the ROC for an increasing number of events. We denoted our wavelet-based method as WAV, while the iterative-filtering based method is denoted with IF. The values of the ROC curves from left to right have been obtained with thresholds values between 0.55 and 1.2 for WAV, and between 0.05 and 0.15 for IF.
As shown in Fig. 8a , with no genuine events WAV can achieve TPR = 1 with FPR = 0. When there are many genuine events, the performance slightly decreases. IF, in comparison, cannot achieve WAV's TPR without a significant increase in false positives. Furthermore, with one or more events FPR = 1 for any TPR higher than zero: this means that regardless of the IF parameters, every time there is an event this triggers detection. This is due to the lack of a learning phase in IF, which is present in WAV instead and enables it to extract the properties of genuine events. This consideration is confirmed by the fact that IF's detection improves with more malicious sensors: indeed the latter can spoof larger events, which look more anomalous for IF.
Both with WAV and IF, the detection performance generally decreases as the number of events increases. The reason is that the continuous changes introduced by genuine events sometimes become valid explanations for the changes brought in by the eliciting sensors.
With masking scenarios there are opposite results compared to eliciting scenarios: the detection performance increases with the number of genuine events. Indeed the shortage of rest sensors with more events makes the masking sensors contradict the measurements of more sensors. Fig. 9 shows that WAV's ROC curve are nearly ideal. As in eliciting scenarios, IF is not able to avoid false positives in masking scenarios when the TPR is higher than zero.
Characterisation
We present below the results for the characterisation task, whose performance is measured by TPR versus FPR averaged across the 50 measurements time snapshots. This is done in WAV for values of T c between 0.1 and 1.0 and in IF for different values of T IF between 0.05 and 0.15. Note that the characterisation algorithm in WAV depends both on the characterisation threshold T c and on the detection threshold T d , hence we show 3D curves for the characterisation TPR and FPR for WAV. IF instead, has a unique threshold, hence it produces 2D curves. Note that characterisation is not a classification problem, hence the TPR is not in a monotonic relationship with the FPR. Indeed a lower threshold T c may shift the blame from a malicious group to a genuine group, causing both a decrease in TPR and an increase in FPR. The result is not a proper ROC curve, therefore we present the TPR and FPR separately.
In Figs. 10 and 11 we show the characterisation results for the eliciting and masking scenario respectively, for increasing number of genuine events. Note that the stability of TPR and FPR for different values of the detection threshold implies that a wrong selection of the detection threshold has a reduced impact on the characterisation performance.
Like for detection, the characterisation performance with increasing number of events shows a decrease in eliciting scenarios and an increase for masking scenarios. WAV's characterisation TPR is quite steady in the area 0:4-0:6 and the FPR is steady as well in the area 0-0:1. IF instead, has a continuous increase of the TPR which is matched with a similar increase in the FPR. However, keeping a reduced amount of malicious sensors in the network is not a major concern since they will be likely discovered in the future, consequently to the reduction of their collusion power. For this reason keeping the FPR to a minimum may be preferred, and in the areas where the FPR is low, the WAV's TPR is amply above IF's.
The reason why WAV's TPR seems upper bounded around 0.5 is that, as explained in Section 9.1, 50 percent of the C malicious sensors were used as blending in sensors, i.e., sensors not actively participating in the eliciting/masking attempt, but acting as accomplices that mediate between genuine and malicious sensors to evade detection. WAV is designed to avoid judging about such sensors because they may be participating in a different genuine event/rest.
Diagnosis
Diagnosis is the most complex step in our methodology, not only because distinguishing faults and malicious interference is a complex problem in nature, but also since the correctness of diagnosis is conditioned to the correctness of both detection and characterisation. This characteristic introduces an error propagation problem that is hard to solve without additional information. Table 1 presents the diagnosis confusion table for We consider also the genuine event category to analyse also which categories evade detection most. As we observe in the first row, the main responsible for a wrong detection are elicited events, which resemble the genuine events most.
As the second row summarises, eliciting scenarios are mainly confused with group faults. Especially when C increases, they are also confused with masking scenarios, as expected. Indeed, with more malicious sensors, inferring if the incomplete events have been elicited or are the remainder of a genuine event is more difficult.
In the third row, we note that masking scenarios are mainly confused with eliciting scenarios, since masking injections that remove most part of a genuine event make the event appear incomplete and it is difficult to say if it has been incompletely elicited or incompletely masked.
In the fourth row we note that single faults are equally confused with the eliciting and masking categories, but not with group faults. Indeed, single faults introduce higher measurements variation, whereas group faults are identified with a low coefficient of variation.
Group faults are more likely to be confused with malicious data injections, as evident at the fifth row. Among them, confusion with eliciting injections prevails because the sensors are simulated to report corrupted measurements that are larger than the real ones.
In general, our diagnosis criteria make a correct classification for a significant portion of samples (around 75 percent). This result has been achieved without any hypothesis about the nature of faults, which would probably improve performance despite reducing the method generality.
Real Worldwide Seismic Vibrations Dataset
The dataset retrieved from a real WSN is made up of measurements collected by seismic networks from around the world [26] , [27] , and kindly provided by the Incorporated Research Institutions of Seismology (IRIS) Data Management Center (DMC) [28] .
The events considered are earthquakes perceived by seismic sensors in: Alaska, Arizona, California, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Dominican Republic. The application to different sensors and different environments highlights that our technique focuses on properties of the physical phenomenon and therefore is particularly suited to WSNs where the sensors enter, leave or migrate across the deployment area. To learn the cross-scale relationship we exploit as few as nine earthquakes. We use other two real earthquakes for testing: one is the Arizona's earthquake of 1st December 2014, the second is the California's earthquake of 30th May 2015, both with a magnitude of 4.7 Richter.
Before applying our methodology, we pre-process the measurements to satisfy our requirement that the measurements magnitude is proportional to the event perceived. In particular, we make a time domain processing known as delayed STA/LTA (DSTALTA) [29] . The STA/LTA algorithm evaluates the ratio of short to long-term energy density, and a delay is added between the two to increase the independence between the two [30] . Finally we apply a logarithm for better visualisation.
Through the help of figures, we present a set of measurements with the respective anomaly score, the sensors given in output by the characterisation step (identified by white crosses), and the diagnosis output (written on top of the anomaly score map). Since we have few samples to learn the cross-scale relationships from this case, it is safer to use higher thresholds. Hence, we used T d ¼ 1:4, and T c ¼ 1:2.
In the experiments presented below, the number of sensors considered is not fixed but it is defined such that the earthquakes boundary are well visible. There are about 800 sensors in the American IRIS networks, but the earthquake is always perceived by only a subset of them. Fig. 12 shows the detection result on the genuine Arizona's earthquake, which is identified as genuine as the anomaly score is lower than T d . In this scenario about 25 sensors perceive mostly the earthquake, while for other 150 the vibrations are close to the noise range ½0; 10 1:5 . As shown in Fig. 13 , detection is neither triggered on the genuine California's earthquake: this is a rare case where two earthquakes are simultaneous (4 p.m. local time) and with close epicentres (northern and southern California). Fig. 14 , shows a sophisticated spoofing attack that is introduced close to a genuine event. The latter is perceived by nearly 30 sensors and the spoofed event, which is introduced by 20 malicious sensors, looks indistinguishable from it. Nevertheless, our detection algorithm triggers, and characterisation assigns different events to different groups (Section 7.1), and is able to return four out of 20 malicious sensors without false positives. Fig. 15 simulates an attacker that is trying to replicate the Arizona's earthquake with the 70 closest sensors to the event peak. Despite the measurements that perceived the event most are correctly replicated, the genuine sensors, which have lower measurements, raise a conflict with the malicious measurements. Here, 14 out of 70 malicious sensors are correctly identified without false positives.
Finally, Fig. 16 shows an attempt to mask the Arizona's earthquake with as many as 120 malicious sensors, whose measurements depict the absence of any event. Note that, as a result, the original event is split into two smaller events, which may be confused with elicited events. Nevertheless, our characterisation algorithm successfully identifies the presence of a masking attack and returns 26 out of 120 malicious sensors without false positives. 14. An elicited event close to a genuine event can be correctly characterised since the characterisation step assigns the two events to different conflicting groups. Fig. 15 . A spoofed event, made as a partial genuine event. The cross-scale relationship is not respected. Fig. 16 . A genuine event that is mostly masked introduces a characterisation problem. The characterisation algorithm is not fooled by the presence of event-like peaks and is able to infer that the measurements were masked.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have focused on detecting malicious data injections in WSNs, in particular when one or more events can occur and collusion between compromised sensors exploits the loss in correlation brought in by them. We have proposed a novel methodology to detect malicious data injections, based on the measurements cross-scale relationship.
In addition, we have provided an approach to characterise malicious colluding nodes, by partitioning the sensor nodes based on the correlation between their measurements. This approach considers the effects of events, hence it is able to detect groups of sensors that elicit or mask events. Finally, we provided a novel measurements-based diagnosis technique to distinguish fault-induced anomalies from malicious anomalies.
We have tested the whole procedure by simulating sophisticated malicious injections on both a synthetic and a real dataset and we conclude that the detection gives highly reliable results. Good results have been achieved for the characterisation and diagnosis phase, even though there is a substantial increase of complexity compared to detection. These are due to error propagation effects as well as to the complexity of the problem itself.
In the future, we aim for a systematic identification of the most threatening malicious data injections, related to the deployment rather than to the attacker's strategy. This would enable to study the effect of mobile sensors on performance, which is not trivial to test. Moreover, an analytical performance evaluation would eliminate the need for real malicious data which is currently difficult to retrieve.
Finally, we plan to improve the diagnosis step by discriminating single faults and non-colluding malicious data injections. A possible approach is to characterise more properties of single faults, for instance through fault statistics or through a fault model. The latter could also model the temporal domain, which has been abstracted from since it is not reliable for detecting malicious data.
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